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I enclose a chapter from a forthcoming book I have co-authored with Sotirios A.
Barber, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions (Oxford University Press,
forthcoming 2007). Let me say a few words to situate this chapter in the book as a whole.
In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin famously argued that fidelity in
interpreting the Constitution as written calls for a fusion of constitutional law and moral
philosophy. Our book takes up that call, arguing for a philosophic approach to constitutional
interpretation. In doing so, we systematically critique competing approaches – textualism,
consensualism, originalism, structuralism, doctrinalism, minimalism, and pragmatism – that
aim and claim to avoid a philosophic approach. We show that, contrary to their claims and
pretensions, these approaches cannot avoid philosophic reflection and choice in interpreting
the Constitution.
At the same time, we do not argue for the exclusivity of the philosophic approach.
Indeed, we contend that fidelity in constitutional interpretation requires a fusion of
philosophic and other approaches, properly understood. Within such a fusion, we would
understand text, consensus, intentions, structures, and doctrines not as alternatives to but as
sites of philosophic reflection and choice about the best understanding of our constitutional
commitments.
The enclosed Chapter 6 critiques narrow or concrete originalism (which we
distinguish from broad originalism and abstract originalism). It should be clear how it relates
to our topic of discussion: “An Eighteenth Century Constitution in a Twenty-First Century
World.” I have included the table of contents to give you an idea of where this chapter
(indicated in bold font) fits into the book as a whole. I would be happy to provide a copy of
the entire book to anyone who wishes to see it.
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Chapter 6

Narrow Originalism/Intentionalism

Suppose we knew the intentions (or original meanings or original understandings1)
of the men who wrote or ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. Would this knowledge help
us decide – in a manner that avoids the need for philosophic reflection and choice – whether
a woman has a right to terminate a pregnancy or marry someone of a different race or of the
same sex – whether, that is, the government needs a compelling reason to deny a woman
these choices? Yes, says contemporary intentionalism, most often called “originalism” (we
shall use the terms interchangeably), a position whose popularity with the ideological
conservatives who now dominate the federal bench has made it the subject of exhaustive
scholarly analysis. In this chapter, we’ll address a relatively narrow or concrete originalism;
in the next chapter, we’ll turn to a relatively broad originalism; we’ll distinguish both from
an

abstract

originalism

that

is

equivalent

to

the

philosophic

approach.

Originalism/intentionalism, narrow or broad, provides no escape from philosophic choice,
for it is only through philosophic argumentation that one can answer questions that must be
answered before the historical search for intentions can even begin. And, once that search
begins, only through the philosophic approach can we decide what those intentions are.
I. Prior Philosophic Questions about Intentions
These prior questions are philosophic questions of different kinds. They include who
we ought to count as “framers” for constitutional purposes. (Some or all members of the
Philadelphia Convention? Members of the state ratifying conventions? Public opinion of the
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1780s and the 1860s?) Our prior questions also include what counts as evidence for original
intention. (Official records and documents – the constitutional text, for example? Private
correspondence by members of the Philadelphia Convention and the state ratifying
conventions? The social practices of the 1780s and the 1860s, by this or that description of
those practices? What historians say about the social practices, statute books, and common
law of the relevant time? Philosophic works influential at the relevant time? The aspirations
of those eras, by this or that account of those aspirations?) We further must consider the
questions of what an intention is, the sense in which a group of people (as distinguished from
an individual) can have an intention, and whether to count what Ronald Dworkin has called
an intention’s concrete aspect or its abstract aspect.2 Should we say, on the concrete side,
that a framer who referred to “fair trials” or “commerce” or “military forces” intended no
more than the specific steps he thought constituted procedural fairness, the specific activities
known to him as commercial, or the specific kinds of military force known to him at the
time? Can we reasonably avoid saying, on the abstract side, that a framer speaking of
fairness or commerce or military force must be understood as referring to things whose
meaning is determined by their nature (or the best understanding of them), not by his
concrete expectations or understandings? How else would we explain the universal
agreement that Congress needed no constitutional amendment to establish an air force?
We can’t find answers to these prior questions in framers’ intentions, of course, for
we must decide these questions before commencing the quest for framers’ intentions.3
Acknowledging the force of these criticisms, leading conservative thinkers like Charles Fried
and Richard Posner have rejected intentionalism for substantive arguments of their own
about what the Constitution ought to be read to mean.4 Robert Bork clings to intentionalism
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for judges, even if not for theorists like himself (in the sense that he acknowledges that
theorists must make arguments for intentionalism, not merely make the circular assertion
that the framers intended intentionalism). He asserts that intentionalism would be mandatory
for judges even if the framers had not intended it for them. Bork supports intentionalism for
judges, not because anyone intended intentionalism for judges, but because he feels
intentionalism best serves an imperative of democracy, namely, restraints on judicial
discretion.5 But because Bork’s view of democracy is controversial and lacks a clear source
in either constitutional text or judicial tradition, it is either arbitrary or dependent on a
philosophic argument, an argument about what democracy ought to mean that neither he nor
any other originalist has made.
Assume, however, that some philosopher had successfully shown that democracy
demands intentionalist judges. Bear in mind that a successful theory of democracy would
have to contend not that the theorist’s private version of democracy demands intentionalist
judges, but that democracy itself demands intentionalist judges and that the moral weight of
democracy overpowers all competing considerations to make intentionalism for judges a
constitutional imperative. (To satisfy yourself of the validity of these requirements on our
theorist, imagine your reaction to someone who said, “You should adopt my theories of
democracy and of what’s good and right because my theories are my theories.”) And if our
philosopher had made the requisite case, she would then have to show whether originalist
judges should seek what Dworkin calls the framers’ abstract intentions or their concrete
intentions.6
As we consider these options, keep sight of where we are in this discussion. We seek
an approach to constitutional meaning in controversial cases, and we’ve seen that plain
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words textualism and consensualism can’t work in such cases. The problems of these
approaches and the discovery that they are bottomed on controversial philosophic
assumptions argue for a fusion of constitutional law and political philosophy. We have
acknowledged objections, however, that such a fusion may be undemocratic, un-American,
dangerous, and ultimately fruitless. So now we’re seeking an approach that avoids these
risks. Intentionalism or originalism may be such an approach. But that prospect can’t be
established by an intentionalist argument. Intentionalism must be defined and defended by
a philosophic argument. Intentionalist theorists can’t escape the burdens and responsibilities
of philosophic reflection and choice. Intentionalism’s only hope is that judges can escape
the burdens and responsibilities of philosophic reflection and choice. And so, again, assume
the theorists have done their philosophic work successfully – assume they’ve shown who
ought to count as framers, what should count as evidence of their intentions, how to deal
with disagreements among leading framers, and so forth. Intentionalist theorists still would
face the question – a philosophic question – of what kind of intention their judges should
seek: abstract intentions or concrete intentions?
Should intentionalist judges assume the framers intended to refer to the concepts of
“due process” and the rest, in which case the framers’ intentions would be abstract
intentions? Or did the framers intend to refer to their conceptions of “due process” and the
rest, in which case their intentions would be concrete intentions? To answer this question,
constitutional theorists will have to show whether abstract intentionalism or concrete
intentionalism is better or worse in light not of some arbitrary standard like what just
happens to be this or that conception of democracy, but in light of what’s really good or right
or democratic, as best we can tell. In practice, this means offering what one’s audience can
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count as good reasons for concluding that intentionalism for judges is as good, right, or
democratic an approach to constitutional interpretation as is presently feasible.
II. Political Philosophy, Abstract Originalism, and Textualism Revisited
Our philosophic defender of intentionalism or originalism can argue for abstract
originalist judges without any sense of alienation from what she’s arguing for. The reason
is that abstract originalist judges, just like their philosophic defenders, would accept
Dworkin’s call for a fusion of constitutional law and political philosophy. Abstract
originalism is for all intents and purposes equivalent to the philosophic approach.7 And both
are equivalent to textualism, properly understood (as distinguished from the plain words
version of textualism we have criticized in Chapter 5). Let us explain.
The words and phrases of the constitutional document express a relatively clear set
of intentions and meanings if by meanings we mean general concepts or ideas and if by
intentions we mean abstract intentions.8 We have clear evidence in the constitutional text
that, through their representatives or the framers, “We the People of the United States”
intended to provide “due process of law,” “equal protection of the laws,” regulations of
“commerce” and other things in a complex institutional scheme for achieving “Justice,” “the
common defence,” “the general Welfare,” and the other goods or ends listed in the Preamble.
These expressions are as clear as they can be if they are taken to refer not to anyone’s
version of due process, equal protection, and the rest but to due process itself, equal
protection itself, and so on. But if the framers intended the concept of due process itself, as
distinguished from some conception of that concept, they had to intend a role for political
philosophy in constitutional interpretation, for philosophic reflection and debate is the best
way to approach the meaning and scope of due process, equal protection, and the
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Constitution’s expressed ends.
Because constitutional provisions like due process are expressed as general concepts,
the constitutional text itself is evidence that the framers’ intentions were abstract. Thus, the
Constitution does not define its terms or give examples of their proper applications. None
of its terms comes wrapped in quotation marks. None of its standards is referred to as
uniquely “ours.” The Constitution doesn’t say, for example, that equal protection envisions
no more than equality before the law, as distinguished from social and economic equality.9
Nor does it say that the persons promised equal protection are of African descent only.10 The
Constitution’s language doesn’t exclude white persons from equal protection, or female
persons, or unborn persons, or poor persons, or even corporate persons, if these entities are
in fact persons or if there are reasons in justice and goodness for treating them as persons.
As Dworkin was the first to suggest, the Constitution’s use of general, undefined, and
unillustrated terms can be judged a failure of draftsmanship only if we assume that the
draftsmen didn’t want justice, due process, and the blessings of liberty themselves as much
as they wanted to impose their conceptions of these things on future generations.11
III. Concrete Intentionalism
Though there’s no support for the concrete view of the framers’ intentions in the
constitutional text itself – or in the literature of the American founding12 – a concrete
intentionalist judge would have to act as if she believed there were. In one of the paradoxes
of her position, the concrete intentionalist judge must insult the motives or deprecate the
intelligence of the framers even as she upholds their authority, for she must say, in effect,
that their expressed concern for fairness and other goods (as opposed to their mere
conceptions of them) was either rhetorical or delusional. She would have to say that they

7

Ch. 6, p. 7

intended their conception of justice even if (1) that conception was seen as unjust at the time
or if (2) it should prove unjust later and if (3) intending injustice is itself unjust
A second paradox of concrete intentionalism is its separation from its justification,
for, as we have seen, only a moral argument can defend concrete intentionalism, yet the
concrete intentionalist judge must, if she can, ignore moral considerations in declaring the
law and stick to concrete historical intentions, however offensive they may be. And she must
do so despite evidence, in both the constitutional text and in the record we have of the public
arguments and the personal correspondence of any figure who might be called a framer, that
the constitutional text refers to moral concepts and the framers saw themselves as engaged
in something other than an exercise in authoritarian self-assertion.
If our argument to this point is right, the theorist who defends concrete intentionalism
contends, in effect, that justice or the people’s happiness or some other good demands the
kind of democracy in which judges sworn to uphold the Constitution ignore undeniable
features of the Constitution’s language and tradition together with the people’s need to see
authority in a favorable moral light. She contends that justice demands that courts uphold
admittedly unjust conceptions of constitutional provisions in the teeth of textual and
historical evidence supporting a different approach. She contends, in brief, that justice at the
wholesale level can demand injustice at the retail level.
Don’t assume that no one can defend such a position. Some have argued, for
example, that although Jim Crow was admittedly unjust and, at the time of Brown v. Board
of Education (1954),13 beyond the political mobilization required to amend the Constitution
to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)14 through the stringent procedures of Article V, Brown
was bad news for a nation that has much to fear from rule by unelected judges.15 So it may
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be possible to argue that a greater justice (freedom from judicial imperialism) justifies living
with courts that enforce injustice (Jim Crow). And if we’ve seen why defenders of concrete
intentionalism can’t themselves be concrete intentionalists, we have yet to see why judges
can’t be concrete intentionalists.
To prepare for the final round with concrete intentionalism, we must be specific
about what a concrete intention might be. Current thinking among intentionalists has settled
on two or three answers. One has judges applying the definitions that the framers attached
to particular constitutional terms.16 A second answer has judges adopting the general outlook
or mindset of the framers.17 A third version of concrete intentions would have judges looking
for the framers’ actual or clearly planned applications of the specific constitutional
provisions to specific situations.18 Although most intentionalists have all but abandoned this
third possibility, we shall have to discuss it.
The framers’ mindset version of concrete intentionalism (the second version above)
can hardly free judges from philosophic choices in hard cases; it can only hope that modern
judges view modern problems as the framers would have done today. Modern judges, like
the framers, would still claim an interest in justice itself – as per the implicit claim in the
Constitution’s language, the political rhetoric of the ratification period, and the publicspirited rhetoric that is typical of politicians and officials everywhere and at all times. (We
are aware of no private correspondence from anyone usually identified as an American
founding father or as a framer or ratifier of any constitutional provision that frankly urges
the ratification of an admittedly unjust, arbitrary, or purely self-serving provision.) And if
modern judges made this claim in good faith, they would remain ready to replace worse
conceptions of constitutional provisions with better ones, as long as they thought like the
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framers when deciding what the better ones would be. Since deciding what’s better would
involve philosophic responsibilities, modern judges would bear those responsibilities, if only
as the framers would have.
But had the framers been interested more in justice than in anyone’s particular
version of justice – as their rhetoric and the language of the Constitution indicates – then the
decisive fact of the framer’s mindset would be their interest in justice. So, judges with the
framers’ mindset would also be interested mostly in justice. This would mean that judges
who would think like the framers would forget the framers and concentrate on the morally
best interpretations that constitutional language plausibly could bear.19 Mindset originalism
thus turns out to be a variation on abstract originalism, and both are equivalent to the
philosophic approach, the bête noire of those who style themselves originalists.
From conceptions as mindsets, concrete intentionalists can move to conceptions as
definitions or verbal entities (our first possibility above): the more or less specific definitions
allegedly held by the framers. An example of such a definition would be equal protection
defined as equality for black Americans in civil rights only, with civil rights defined to
include nothing beyond (1) the right to equal benefits (like police and fire protection) under
laws designed to protect persons and property, (2) an equal right to contract with other
persons for goods and services, (3) and equal access to the civil courts.20 This intentionalist
says, in effect, that in hard cases involving the Equal Protection Clause, judges should ignore
the constitutional definiendum – equal protection – and concentrate on what research into
the historical record reveals as the definiens – equal access to the courts, equal right to
contract, and so on.
Objections to this approach replay the difficulties of intentionalism generally. How
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do we decide whose definition to count and what evidence to derive definitions from? How
can we attribute just one definition in the face of apparent disagreements among the
founding’s leading figures?21 If we assumed these problems resolved, we would still face the
question of what it means to employ someone’s definition. Are we faithful to someone’s
definition of X when we confound the definition with what it is supposed to be a definition
of? When intentionalists ignore the definiendum, they no longer treat the definiens as a
definiens. When we define, we define something, and a definition can’t be known as the
definition of something if we ignore the thing to be defined. This seems a feature of our
ordinary linguistic practice. Another such feature is our understanding that definitions can
be inadequate or wrong, and that when definition is our aim, we should replace worse
definitions with better ones when better ones appear. To replace “equal protection” with
“equal access to the courts” and the like is therefore not to define “equal protection,” it is to
ignore it. By keeping both the definiendum and the proposed definiens in mind, we see that
the proposed definiens is revisable. A concrete intentionalism that confounds definiendum
and definiens thus deviates from a linguistic practice that treats definitions of equal
protection and similar terms as no more than revisable theories of their nature.22 A
definitional approach, properly conceived, thus argues for the same result as a mindset
approach, properly conceived: a fusion of constitutional law and political philosophy.
To avoid this result, our intentionalist might resort to the framers’ actual or planned
applications of constitutional provisions (our third possibility above). He might say, for
example, that equal protection would not prohibit segregated schools because the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed segregated schools and discussed no plans to outlaw
them.23 Modern intentionalists shy away from this position for compelling practical reasons.
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Consistently applied, a framers’-application approach would disable governmental powers
as well as individual and minority rights.24 A framers’-application approach might
undermine not only the constitutionality of the nation’s labor laws and social welfare
programs; it also would undermine the legality of NASA and the Air Force, federal laws
against drug abuse, interstate kidnapping, and racketeering, executive agreements with
foreign nations, presidential vetoes on grounds unrelated to the preservation of presidential
powers, and many other practices of modern government.25
Beyond these practical problems lies a theoretical problem with a framers’application approach: applications of constitutional provisions are events, not verbal entities,
and only verbal entities can function as norms for guiding conduct or as premises that justify
legal decisions. To be useful in constitutional interpretation, therefore, the events in question
– the framers’ applications of constitutional provisions – would have to be described.
Because any event can always be described in different ways, because descriptions are
contextual, and because different descriptions can justify different legal outcomes,
controversial choices among alternative descriptions are unavoidable.
Let us be specific about what descriptions we shall need. Applications of
constitutional provisions are events of a kind called actions. These actions apply
constitutional provisions to concrete acts or practices of government to determine the
constitutionality of those acts or practices. The Equal Protection Clause, for example, would
be applied to the practice of racially segregating public schools to determine the
constitutionality of that practice. The act of applying the Equal Protection Clause would
consist of two steps: interpreting the Clause and describing the practice of segregation in
terms relevant to one’s interpretation of the Clause. These two steps can be represented as
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the premises of a syllogism – with the major premise stating a rule or principle of law and
the minor premise a description of the act or practice to which the law applies – and the
conclusion represents the decision of the instant case. How, then, would we represent the
framers’ application of the Equal Protection Clause to the practice of racially segregating
public schools?
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment (some or all of them) might have
described their own action as excluding segregated schools from the prohibitions of the
Equal Protection Clause. We shall assume this for present purposes. The actual words of the
Clause, however, can hardly be reduced to “permit segregated schools.” We can represent
the framers’ action as a legal syllogism whose major premise is that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits state governmental actions that harm racial minorities invidiously. The
minor premise of the framers’ action, on our present assumption, was not a statement about
the law of the Constitution; it was a statement about the world. We can formulate their minor
premise to say that segregation of the races does no unique harm to racial minorities – that
is, if segregation harms anyone, it harms whites as well as blacks. From the major and the
minor premises together the holding follows: segregation doesn’t deny equal protection.
Because this is a plausible way to represent what the framers did, we can say that the
Brown Court didn’t change the framers’ view of the law when it rejected the framers’ view
of the world (together with the view of Plessy that the regime of “separate but equal” did not
harm blacks26). Let us assume that the Equal Protection Clause meant the same to both sets
of interpreters: states may not harm racial minorities in special ways.27 But the view of the
world had changed between the 1860s, when the Clause was ratified, and the 1950s, when
the issue of segregated schools came before the Court. The framers (we are assuming for the
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sake of argument) thought that forced segregation didn’t hurt blacks any more than it hurt
whites. The Brown Court found otherwise through an argument that used scientific evidence
to confirm the testimony of common sense: forced segregation of the races in modern
America did indeed harm racial minorities invidiously. The old major premise then
combined with the new minor premise to outlaw forced segregation. On this account of what
the framers actually did, the Brown Court did not depart from the framers’ view of the law,
and this description seems as fair as any to the historical record. No less an originalist than
Robert Bork has used a similar argument to rationalize his approval of Brown.28 What is
more, our argument accords with that of the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
(1992), that Brown was justified in overruling Plessy because of a change in understanding
of the facts about the world.29
A heroic (or diehard) strain of originalism might try to prove its originalist bona fides
by declaring Brown a mistake and by insisting that judges adopt the framers’ view of the
world in addition to the framers’ view of the law. They might say that as a matter of law,
segregation is not harmful – regardless of the scientific or common sense evidence to the
contrary – and that segregation will remain harmless as a matter of law until the law is
changed by formal constitutional amendment. But prudent originalists can’t welcome a
strategy that serves only to expose the high costs of originalism. It’s hard to argue that the
framers or anyone else could acquire either the right or the power to establish not only the
law but also the facts of life. It’s hard to argue that our constitutional system can’t operate
without resort to descriptions of the world repulsive to science and common sense. Tradition
itself is one of the things that makes these arguments hard to advance.30 The nation’s
Enlightenment tradition places a heavy burden on any suggestion that the facts of life can
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be determined by fiat or that the Constitution forces judges to falsify the world. Sometimes
we can change the facts of life by altering their causes. But to alter causal relationships
successfully, we usually have to understand them first. Laws that force us to falsify reality
cripple our hopes for shaping reality, and there’s no good reason to view the Constitution as
such a law.
IV. What Is the New Originalism? Same as the Old Originalism?
Many self-styled originalists are at pains to differentiate themselves from concrete
originalists (like Raoul Berger) and to insist that their versions of originalism are not
vulnerable to common criticisms of concrete originalism.31 Keith Whittington openly
professes a new originalism in an article entitled, appropriately enough, The New
Originalism.32 One might think that the new, improved originalists would be scholars and
jurists who seek to reconstruct originalism to correct the theoretical flaws of the old
originalism, or at least to bolster it against powerful criticisms. But Whittington, with
startling and refreshing frankness, provides a rather different account: He says that the new
originalists are conservatives in power, whereas the old originalists were conservatives in
the minority! His account of the old originalism is that it emerged as a conservative reaction
against the Warren Court, and was mostly negative and critical of Warren Court decisions
like Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), recognizing a right of privacy, and early Burger Court
decisions like Roe v. Wade (1973), protecting the right of a woman to terminate a
pregnancy.33 Now that conservatives are in power and have control of the judiciary,
Whittington says, originalists need to move from being largely reactive and critical to
developing “a governing philosophy appropriate to guide majority opinions, not just to fill
dissents.”34 Enter the new originalism.
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The new originalism as a governing conservative constitutional theory, Whittington
suggests, “is less likely to emphasize a primary commitment to judicial restraint,”35 the
leading aim of the old originalism. Indeed. First, “there seems to be less emphasis on the
capacity of originalism to limit the discretion of the judge.” Second, “there is also a
loosening of the connection between originalism and judicial deference to legislative
majorities.” Instead, “[t]he primary virtue claimed by the new originalism is one of
constitutional fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic majoritarianism.” In sum,
Whittington argues, the new originalism “does not require that judges get out of the way of
legislatures. It requires that judges uphold the original Constitution – nothing more, but also
nothing less.”36 We have always known this – that originalism is not fundamentally a theory
of “judicial restraint” or democratic majoritarianism – but rather a program for upholding
the Constitution as originalists conceive it. Still, it’s good to hear it proclaimed by the
leading theorist of the new originalism.
How, then, does the new originalism view the Constitution? In his book,
Constitutional Interpretation, Whittington seeks to reconstruct originalism and rescue it
from the flaws of the old originalism (or, he says, its supposed flaws).37 Immediately below,
we will assess his work, but here we preview the punch line of our critique. Whittington
once introduced an article with a quotation from a song by the rock and roll band The Who.38
To encapsulate our critique of Whittington’s originalism, we too invoke a line from a Who
song. The song is “Won’t Get Fooled Again”; the lyric is “Meet the new boss. Same as the
old boss.”39 This line is apt not only because it suggests that the new originalism suffers from
the same flaws as the old, but also because the notion of “boss” calls to mind the
authoritarianism of originalism, old and new. (Fittingly, a recent article in the New York
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Times reported that this song by The Who is the top conservative rock song of all time, as
chosen by National Review.40)
A. Interpretation

Originalism

Originalists sometimes claim or assume that interpretation necessarily entails
originalism, ranging from naive or crude to sophisticated versions of this claim. This move
is most famously illustrated in the old, discredited dichotomy of “interpretivism” versus
“noninterpretivism.”41 People who now call themselves originalists used this dichotomy to
load the dice in favor of interpretivism, saying that they were the ones who believe in
“interpreting” the Constitution, while the others advocate “noninterpreting” it (remaking or
changing it).
As stated above, Whittington’s project in Constitutional Interpretation is to
reconstruct originalism. His first move is to concede points to critics of originalism. For
example, he more forthrightly grapples with arguments Dworkin has made about
interpretation than any other originalist.42 Unlike Bork and Scalia, he doesn’t simply hurl
insults about Dworkin being a “noninterpretivist” or even a heretic or expatriate who would
subvert the Constitution.43 For example, Whittington appears to concede that Dworkin (and
Thomas Grey) are right in saying that “We are all interpretivists” and that the real question
is not whether we should interpret or not, but rather what the Constitution is and how should
we interpret it?44 Thus, Whittington appears to concede that Dworkin has advanced a
conception of interpretation that is an alternative to originalism.
What is more, Whittington’s project in his companion book, Constitutional
Construction, is to broaden constitutional discourse to include two ways of elaborating
constitutional meaning: not only interpretation by courts (the characteristic preoccupation
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of the old originalists) but also construction outside the courts by legislatures and
executives.45 He explains: “Unlike jurisprudential interpretation, construction provides for
an element of creativity in construing constitutional meaning. Constructions do not pursue
a preexisting if deeply hidden meaning in the founding document; rather, they elucidate the
text in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive meaning, whether the text is so broad or
so underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.”46
But then, just when it begins to look like Whittington is developing a constitutional theory
– of interpretation and construction – that might be safe for people who are not concrete
originalists, he makes the two key moves. The first move is to say that what people like
Dworkin (and us) call interpretation is really construction, and therefore is appropriate for
legislatures but not for courts.47 That is, he tries to deflect the force of Dworkin’s criticisms
of originalism by saying that Dworkin’s conception of interpretation more properly should
be understood as a theory of construction, which would be appropriate for legislatures, not
courts. This is Whittington’s more sophisticated version of Bork’s and Scalia’s claims that
Dworkin is advocating judicial legislation – judges making law, not interpreting law.
Whittington’s second move is to say that a commitment to interpretation necessarily
entails a commitment to originalism. Indeed, Whittington practically revives a version of the
discredited distinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. He writes that his
“account of originalism largely assumes a prior commitment on the part of constitutional
theorists, judges, and the nation to constitutional interpretation.” He continues: “If we are
to interpret, then I believe we must be originalists.”48 That is, interpretation = originalism.
He adds: “But we may not want to interpret.... We may want to engage in a ‘text-based
social practice,’ but that is not the same thing as being committed to interpretive fidelity.”49
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That is, the people who want to do that are not interpreting. Here he echoes the discredited
old charge that anyone who is not committed to an originalist conception of interpretive
fidelity is a “noninterpretivist.”
We want to step back for a moment and offer a hypothesis about what Whittington
is doing. Our suggestion is that in responding to critiques of the old originalism, Whittington
tried to expand the realm of constitutional discourse to include constitutional construction
outside the courts; but he did so in order to justify narrowing constitutional interpretation
inside the courts to originalism. All of this was a rhetorically effective way of seeming to
agree with arguments that no originalist could answer, while deflecting those arguments and
reinstating positions that no originalist can defend. Whittington sketches a notion of
constitutional construction by legislatures and executives, and gives such historical examples
of it as the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1804-05, which helped establish
subsequent understandings of the purpose and limits of federal impeachment power and the
nullification crisis of 1832-33, which promoted more decentralizing conceptions of
federalism.50 Yet he does not articulate criteria for distinguishing kinds of decisions that are
appropriately made by courts through “interpretation” and kinds of decisions that should be
left to legislatures and executives through “construction.” Nor does he answer the question
why courts should limit themselves to what he calls “interpretation” rather than
“construction.” As stated above, he throws out the old originalist claims about “judicial
restraint” and “democratic majoritarianism.” All that is left is his assumption that
interpretation necessarily entails originalism.
Whittington’s distinction between interpretation and construction is a distraction
from the basic questions. The distinction was originally motivated by his early interest in
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restraining what was then a liberal federal judiciary – not the discovery of constitutional
meaning. Moreover, as Whittington treats the distinction, it is useless to us because he
himself says that both construction and interpretation are methods of elaborating
constitutional meaning. From Whittington’s own use of the distinction, interpretation is mere
discovery and application of noncontroversial constitutional provisions (like those relating
to the frequency of elections and the ages of officials), while construction occurs when
controversial ideas whose meaning cannot be reduced to uncontroversial legal rules (equal
protection, due process, and the like) are elaborated and applied.51 “Construction”
(Whittington’s approach to hard cases) thus does the work that “interpretation” does in this
book. Whittington’s “construction” is equivalent to what we dub (in Chapter 11) the
pragmatist view of interpretation – essentially a policy-making process of the kind one
leaves to legislatures, which is precisely what Whittington wanted to do before the Bush
White House and Senate populated the federal judiciary with conservatives. Finally, we’ve
never seen anyone use the distinction consistently. The terms “construction” and
“interpretation” are freely used as synonyms for each other in The Federalist and throughout
constitutional history and commentary before Whittington. One need only recall Chief
Justice John Marshall’s famous statement in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) that resolution
of the question whether Congress had the power to establish a bank depended upon “a fair
construction of the whole instrument.”52
B. Fidelity to the Constitution As Written
Originalism, old and new, makes a virtue of claiming to exile moral and political
philosophy from the province of constitutional interpretation. That is neither possible nor
desirable, nor is it appropriate in interpreting our Constitution, which establishes a scheme
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of abstract aspirational principles and ends, not a code of detailed rules. Interpreting our
Constitution with fidelity requires judgments of moral and political philosophy about how
those principles are best understood.
Originalism, old and new, misconceives fidelity in constitutional interpretation.
Under the best conception of fidelity – fidelity to the Constitution as written – we conceive
fidelity as honoring our aspirational principles – the principles to which we as a people
aspire, and the principles for which we as a people stand – rather than as following selective
historical practices and selective concrete original understandings, which surely have failed
to realize our aspirations.53 Ironically, in the name of interpretive fidelity, originalists would
enshrine an authoritarian constitution which defies justification and which the framers didn’t
write and the ratifiers didn’t ratify – a constitution which does not deserve our fidelity. The
philosophic approach, because it accepts the Constitution’s actual language and therewith
the moral justification that the framers and the founding generation claimed for themselves,
has no choice but to interpret – and exhorts us to interpret the Constitution so as to make it
the best it can be. The philosophic approach thus offers hope that the Constitution may
deserve the fidelity that it claims to deserve.
From

what

we’ve

seen

so

far,

therefore,

narrow

or

concrete

originalism/intentionalism (whether old or new) has no successful argument against
Dworkin’s showing that the Constitution, as written, demands a fusion of constitutional law
and political philosophy. We’ll have to see, in Chapter 7, whether originalism has still
further arguments and whether yet another kind of originalism, broad originalism, can
succeed where the others have failed.
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